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{"sheet":"How to use this workbook","index":0,"n_rows":30,"n_cols":2,"rows_kept":30,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["Planning and Analysis Tools for The RISE Education Systems Diagnostic"]
["To be used alongside The RISE Education Systems Diagnostic Toolkit, available at:"]
["https://doi.org/10.35489/BSG-RISE-Misc_2023/09"]
[]
["Version control:"]
["Version","Changes"]
["v0.0","Preliminary version for teams piloting the Education Systems Diagnostic"]
["v1.0","Initial version for the launch of the RISE Diagnostic Toolkit"]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[null,"Note: Tools  #4, #5, and #6 include lengthy guidance notes and illustrative indicators. Teams may sometimes find convenient to hide these notes while filling in these tools. To do so, please select \"Enable macros\" when opening the spreadsheet, and then use the Show/Hide buttons in rows 3 and 4 of the tools in question."]
[]
["List of annexes:"]
["Tool #1","Steering committee list \nUse Tool #1 during the inception phase to help identify organisations/individuals that should be represented on the steering committee."]
["Tool #2","Stakeholder list\nUse Tool #2 during the desk review phase to help map the various stakeholders within the education system. This list can then be used to facilitate planning the stakeholder workshops and interviews phase. "]
["Tool #3","Document list\nUse Tool #3 during the desk review phase as a starting point for identifying key government documents and policies to t review."]
["Tool #4","Compact analysis\nUse Tool #4 during: \n(a) the desk review phase to facilitate a preliminary diagnostic analysis of the elements of the Compact relationships and their dominant alignments, and to identify gaps in information from available documents and the diagnostic team's prior knowledge; \n(b) during the stakeholder workshops and interviews phase to plan the topical emphases for each workshop/interview with various stakeholders, and as a starting point for crafting questions to be used in materials or instruments for these workshops/interviews; and\n(c) during the analysis phase to record the dominant alignments of each element and an overall description of the relationship."]
["Tool #5","Management analysis\nAs with Tool #4 above."]
["Tool #6","Voice & Choice analysis\nAs with Tool #4 above."]
["Tool #7","Misalignments analysis\nUse Tool #7 during the preliminary diagnostic analysis of the desk review phase and during the main analysis phase to facilitate the identification of significant misalignments within and between relationships in the education system, and of principles for intervening to resolve these misalignments. These misalignments will then inform the prioritisation workshop and the final report"]
[]
["This workbook should be used alongside the RISE Education Systems Diagnostic Toolkit, which includes:"]
["Guide to Applying the RISE Education Systems Diagnostic"]
[null,"This implementation guide includes additional guidelines on how to use the annexes, and on each of the phases of the diagnostic approach mentioned in the descriptions of the annexes above."]
["Understanding the RISE Systems Framework"]
[null,"This insight note outlines the analytical framework—with relationships, elements, alignments, and misalignments—underlying the education systems diagnostic"]
["Glossary"]
[null,"This glossary is a quick reference explaning  the terminology used in these tools."]

{"sheet":"Tool #1 Steering committee list","index":1,"n_rows":16,"n_cols":6,"rows_kept":16,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[15,1,15,5]]}
["Tool #1. Steering committee list"]
[]
[null,"No. ","Name","Title","Organisation ","Type*"]
[null,1,null,null,null,"Gov (Min of Ed)"]
[null,2,null,null,null,"Gov (Min of Ed)"]
[null,3,null,null,null,"Gov (Min of Ed)"]
[null,4,null,null,null,"Gov (Min of Ed)"]
[null,5,null,null,null,"Gov (Finance)"]
[null,6,null,null,null,"Gov (Finance)"]
[null,7,null,null,null,"Gov (Other) "]
[null,8,null,null,null,"Gov (Other) "]
[null,9,null,null,null,"Civil Society"]
[null,10,null,null,null,"Civil Society"]
[null,11,null,null,null,"Academia/research"]
[null,12,null,null,null,"Academia/research"]
[null,"*Note: Types reflect suggested distribution of representation among steering committee. This distribution should be modified as needed to adapt to context. "]

{"sheet":"Tool #2  Stakeholder list","index":2,"n_rows":35,"n_cols":7,"rows_kept":35,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[2,1,3,1],[2,2,3,2],[2,3,2,6]]}
["Tool #2. Stakeholder list"]
[]
[null,"Function/role*","Organisation(s)","Organisational position in the RISE Framework \n(principal and/or agent in which relationships?)"]
[null,null,null,"Politics","Compact ","Management","Voice & Choice"]
[null,"Example: \nExams","Example: \nNational Examinations Board","—","Agent","Principal","—"]
[null,"Exams"]
[null,"Inspections"]
[null,"Curriculum "]
[null,"Teacher qualifications and standards"]
[null,"Teacher hiring"]
[null,"Teacher placement"]
[null,"Finances"]
[null,"School construction "]
[null,"Planning "]
[null,"Teacher promotion "]
[null,"Ministry of Education "]
[null,"Ministry of Finance"]
[null,"Ministry of Local Government (if involved in school inspection, infrastructure, funding, etc.)"]
[null,"Teacher unions"]
[null,"Donors "]
[null,"Regulation of private schools"]
[null,"Religious authorities with responsibility for schooling"]
[null,"Social protection organisations involved in education "]
[null,"Civil society organisations involved in education "]
[null,"Local community organisations involved in schooling"]
[null,"Executive authority"]
[null,"Legislative authority"]
[null,"Fiduciary authority"]
[null,"Headteachers"]
[null,"Teachers"]
[null,"Children and their families"]
[]
[]
[]
[null,"*Note: Functions/roles listed represent a selection of common functions/roles in an education system. This may vary between systems and should be adapted to context. "]

{"sheet":"Tool #3 Document list","index":3,"n_rows":22,"n_cols":4,"rows_kept":22,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["Tool #3. Document list"]
[]
[null,"Document*","Located?","Included in initial desk review?"]
[null,"Education sector plan"]
[null,"National development plan sections on education"]
[null,"Most recent inspection handbook / guide / plan "]
[null,"Most recent decentralisation plan / guidance / law"]
[null,"Most recent teacher law / regulation / qualification / teacher placement guide "]
[null,"Most recent curriculum reform(s) "]
[null,"Most recent assessment framework or policy (school-leaving exam)"]
[null,"Most recent assessment framework or policy (sample-based assessment / learning assessment) "]
[null,"Most recent guidance / policy on district management of schools, teacher supervision and support"]
[null,"Most recent guidance / policy for school construction / improvement"]
[null,"Most recent guidance on regulation of private sector "]
[null,"Most recent budget "]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[null,"*Note: document list is suggestive based on documents that will commonly be helpful across education systems. This should be adapted to context. "]

{"sheet":"Tool #4 Compact analyis","index":4,"n_rows":47,"n_cols":8,"rows_kept":47,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[28,3,28,6],[29,3,29,6],[31,1,35,1],[31,3,31,6],[46,0,46,1],[46,2,46,7],[2,1,2,6],[3,1,3,6],[36,0,45,0],[21,0,35,0],[6,0,20,0],[30,3,30,6],[45,3,45,6],[41,1,45,1],[21,1,25,1],[36,1,40,1],[43,3,43,6],[26,1,30,1],[33,3,33,6],[16,1,20,1],[19,3,19,6],[9,3,9,6],[6,7,20,7],[26,3,26,6],[40,3,40,6],[36,3,36,6],[16,3,16,6],[18,3,18,6],[21,7,35,7],[36,7,45,7],[41,3,41,6],[34,3,34,6],[35,3,35,6],[24,3,24,6],[25,3,25,6],[38,3,38,6],[39,3,39,6],[44,3,44,6],[20,3,20,6],[21,3,21,6],[23,3,23,6],[6,1,10,1],[14,3,14,6],[11,1,15,1],[13,3,13,6],[8,3,8,6],[15,3,15,6],[6,3,6,6],[10,3,10,6],[11,3,11,6]]}
["Tool #4. Compact analysis"]
[]
["Principal organisation(s)"]
["Agent organisation(s)"]
["Element","Sub-element",null,"Aligned for learning","Aligned for access","Aligned for socialisation","Aligned for patronage and/or specific interest groups","Description of element "]
[null,null,"Notes","Relationship is aligned around the goal of all children learning. Clear goals for learning are articulated, financed, and supported. ","These systems focus on expansion (getting all kids in school), and there is an emphasis on enrolment and grade attainment/level completion. While these systems may talk about \"quality\", it is usually not defined in relationship to learning outcomes, and is instead connected to a laundry list of \"thin\" inputs (i.e., things measured by EMIS) as opposed to teaching and learning practices in the classroom. ","Relationship is characterized by socialisation or ideological goal. These types prioritise socialising children into a set of values. Can be co-aligned with an access or learning agenda. ","Relationship is aligned for a purpose other than education.  In patronage systems, politicians and those in power use the system as a patronage mill (e.g., to hire teachers, or to build schools for certain constituencies). Often, those who have enough resources will opt out of the public system (resulting in a large low-cost private school sector). \nIn systems aligned for specific interest groups, the dominant priority is fulfilling narrow elements of particular interest groups (e.g. profits of textbook producers, or the employment/wage concerns of teacher's unions as distinct from their legitimate role as professional organizations in promoting good education). This system pretends to be another type on paper, but de facto does not deliver schooling or learning for all.","Bullet point or short narrative description of the overall alignment of this element (delegation, finance, information).\n\nNote: draft a preliminary description during the desk review, and update the description after the workshops / interviews have been completed."]
["Delegation ","Compact-Delegation (i)\n\nHigh-level target: What goals does the executive authority for the education system?","Guiding questions","What are the priorities of the the state executive authorities for the education system? \nWhat would a successful Ministry of Education look like to the executive authorities? "]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Executive authorities sets clear, measurable, achievable goals for progress on cohort learning at early, middle, and late stages.  \n\n• Executive authorities consider issues of learning equity and equality of opportunity in setting learning objectives","• Executive authorities sets and manages towards goals to expand to universal enrolment and completion of a given level of schooling (basic, primary, or secondary).  \n\n• Equity, equality of opportunity, and inclusivity are all components, and are considered in terms of access and attainment. ","• Executive authorities set goals related to promoting patriotic allegiance to the state, common national language, or transmission of religious values to next generation.","• Executive authorities' goals in education are primarily oriented toward maintaining power for the regime and/or satisfying interest groups' needs.  \n \n• Decisions in education are dominated by political cycles. Policy objectives are weak but political objectives are strong. "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Compact-Delegation (ii)\n\nHuman resources: How does the executive set human resource goals?","Guiding questions","What are the executive authorities' priorities for the teaching profession? \nWhat does the executive authority want or expect the ministry to do with or for teachers?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Support the professional craft of teaching (e.g., through an emphasis on continuous professional development that responds to frontline needs rather than ticking a box through a cascade model; through attracting, retaining, and motivating individuals who prioritise children's learning)","• Attract and retain enough qualified teachers. There is more emphasis on the quality of teachers (e.g. number of teachers meeting formal qualification standards, usually based on education level and entry tests), rather than on the quality of teaching.","• Ensure that teachers and teaching align with social or ideological objectives.","Patronage systems:\n• Goals are to attract politically supportive teachers and reward allies. \n\n• There is pressure to use HR system as a tool for political objectives.\n\nSpecific interest group systems:\n• Maintain and expand teacher qualifications and benefits in ways that are unrelated to performance."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Compact-Delegation (iii)\n\nDe jure / de facto gap in delegation: How much of a gap is there between articulated and actual goals?","Guiding questions","According to education authorities (e.g., high-level education ministry officials), what do the state executive and fiduciary authorities want them to prioritise and achieve?\nWhat are the expectations and targets that, if unmet by the education ministry, are likely to trigger action, meetings, or repercussions from the executive and fiduciary authorities?\nWhat are the executive authorities' expectations and priorities for the budget allocation process?\nHow similar are these de facto priorities, expectations, and targets as compared to the state executive's publicly articulated goals for the education system?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• If there are gaps between de jure and de facto delegation, the de jure expectations that are not prioritised de facto are aspects that do not contribute directly to student learning. (e.g., the state executive would pay more attention to failure to meet learning goals than to failure to meet infrastructure development goals).","• If there are gaps between de jure and de facto delegation, the de jure expectations that are not prioritised de facto are aspects that do not contribute directly to student enrolment. (e.g., the state executive would pay more attention to failure to meet schooling access goals than to failure to make progress toward SDG4 foundational literacy and numeracy targets).","• If there are gaps between de jure and de facto delegation, the de jure expectations that are not prioritised de facto are aspects that do not contribute directly to student socialisation. (e.g., the state executive would pay more attention to failure to teach in the national language than to failure to meet numeracy or inclusion goals).","• The state may use bureaucratic structures to disguise their true intentions. (e.g., there may be public-facing reform rhetoric but without any substantial de jure or de facto reform; or there may be de jure changes in policy priorities which do not lead to de facto changes, whether due to a lack of financing/support or a lack of information and monitoring or blockage of implementation by key agents)."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Finance ","Compact-Finance (i)\n\nGeneral: What are the state authorities' priorities in education financing?","Guiding questions","How are fiscal allocation decisions made by the executive or fiduciary authority? \nHow does the executive or fiduciary authority make decisions about education ministry budgets? \nWhen the ministry of education proposes changes to budgets, what is the state's process and reasoning for accepting or rejecting them?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Finance is adequately structured and allocated to meet learning goals. Financial decisions are justified by the Ministry of Education to the executive and financial authorities on the basis of their impact on learning. ","• Budgetary plans are based on schooling expansion needs, determined by unit costs of enrolment (demographics, class sizes, and staff salaries).","• Budgetary plans are based on ideological goals. State authorities are more likely to accept proposed changes to budgets if they relate to socialisation goals, such as new instructional materials to reflect current political priorities (rather than to reflect new assessment data on children's learning needs), or a new teacher professional development programme to promote instruction the national language (rather than to improve children's mother tongue literacy).","Patronage systems:\n• Finance prioritses expansion and infrastructure. Inadequate financial allocation and a shambolic budgeting process.\n\nSpecific interest group systems:\n• If the teachers' union is a dominant poltical force, financing may be earmarked for teacher salaries and benefits in ways unrelated to performance, or teacher salary allocations leave too little budget for other needed inputs or practices critical to learning."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Compact-Finance (ii)\n\nInnovation: To what extent, and on what basis, is there flexility in education financing?","Guiding questions","How are budget lines for non-teacher-related inputs structured?\nWhat is the relative distribution of finances to fixed/recurring expenditures as compared to innovation/development spending?\nNote: The structure of teacher compensation is addressed under Management-Finance (ii)."]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• There is sufficient financing allocated flexibly to non-recurring expenditure to allow for innovation toward learning goals.\n\n• Non-salary finance is structured to maximise learning, including articulation of mechanisms for how financial allocations with directly/indirectly lead to student learning gains.","• The overwhelming majority of spending is allocated toward recurring expenditures.\n\n• Non-salaray spending is locked into input-related budget headings that allow for little flexibility at the local level in response to local needs\n","• Non-salary spending goes to inputs (e.g., school infrastucture, instructional materials). \n\n• Regardless of the de jure financial rules, budget lines may be de facto repurposed to serve socialisation goals (e.g., channelling funds for mother tongue literacy toward national language literacy).","• Spending on educational inputs is determined by short-term objectives that are unrelated to learning goals. \n\n• Regardless of the de jure financial rules, any de facto flexibility in finance is used to consolidate political influence or to appease powerful interest groups."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Compact-Finance (iii)\n\nSpider vs. starfish: How is discretion over education financing distributed between the state executive / fiduciary authorities and education authorities?","Guiding questions","When making decisions about education financing, whose perspectives (if any) do the executive and fiduciary authorities take into account? \nWhat could prompt changes to finance allocations (by executive and fiduciary authorities)? \nWhat was a recent change to a policy or procedure proposed by the ministry of education? Was it adopted? Why or why not?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Organisation(s) responsible for implementation (e.g., national or regional education authority) have enough discretion over finances that they can reallocate funds to better meet learning goals in their jurisdiction."," • To control limited resources, financial decisions are made at the top.","• State authorities maintain centralised control of finance to protect the socialisation objective.\n  \n• If religion is a priority in socialisation: Significant amolunts of finance flows directly to religious schools.","• State authorities maintain centralised control of budgeting decisions to maintain political power and/or appease influential groups."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Information","Compact-Information (i)\n\nGeneral: What is the structure of  educational information collected by (or for) state authorities?","Guiding questions","What information is received by the executive or fiduciary authorities about the performance of education authorities? \nWho is this information shared with (i.e., which offices)? Is education raised in highest level meetings as a national issue? \nWhat information about performance is produced by education authorities to report on their performance? \nIf the ministry of education produces reports on performance, what do they contain (on learning, on utilisation of funds, on procurement, on access and attainment)?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Education authorities and organisations produce regular, reliable, relevant information on progress towards articulated, shared goals including, learning at early, middle, and late stages in education. This learning outcomes data goes beyond agggated scores on high-stakes end-of-primary and end-of-secondary cycle exit exams. \n\n• There is tracking of cohort learning targets, which includes tracking of learning at each grade and children's persistence in school. ","• Education authorities and organisations only produce and communicate regular, reliable information on enrolment, grade completion, results of high-stakes exams at the end of the school cycle, utilisation of thin inputs (including teacher stock and attendance), and process compliance. ","• In addition to other information, education authorities and organisations collect information on compliance with value-promoting policies (e.g., number of children receiving lessons in the national religion, number of teachers trained in the new curriculum for the national language).","• State authorities neither want nor need updated information about the education system. It pays to be ignorant. \n\n• The information that does exist is viewed as holding power, and so is not shared easily. \n\n• Bureaucratic \"facts\" are fiction (i.e., do not reflect reality). Reporting is neither regular nor reliable.  "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Compact-Information (ii)\n\nQuality: How do state authorities determine that education is of sufficient \"quality\"?","Guiding questions","What standards and practices does the system consider in its definition of \"quality\" education and \"quality\" schools?\nWhat would the executive authority need to see the ministry of education deliver to consider it to be successful?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Measures of learning outcomes are an important (though certainly not exclusive) element of assessing quality of education and school quality.\n\n• Accounts-based accountability information (i.e., not just standardised quantitative measurements, but context-specific justifications for decisions and outcomes) is provided on progress towards articulated learning goals and targets.  This will often coexist alongside accounting-based accountability for other (non- learning) goals and targets.","• The determination of “quality” of schooling is based only or almost exclusively on inputs (e.g., having adequate thin inputs to deliver quality school, quality is determined by thin observable features of the school). \n\n• There is only or almost exclusively accounting-based accountability (i.e., tracking of standardised quantitative measurements) around thin targets.","• The determination of \"quality\" is based on the number or proportion of students who are reached by education in the desired sociopolitical political / religious / linguistic mindset.","• No serious attempt to define and determine quality of learning and, to the extent \"quality\" is measured, it is redefined to mean the system has acquired enough inputs to support political goals and reward allies."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Overall description of the Compact relationship\n\nPossible questions to consider: \n- Overall what is the dominant goal that the relationship is aligned with?\n- How much alignment or misalignment is there between the elements? Are the elements aligned toward the same goals or different goals? \n- Are there de jure and de facto gaps between the elements? (e.g., Delegation defines success or quality in a certain way de jure, but there is no Information collected about it de facto.) "]

{"sheet":"Tool #5 Management analysis","index":5,"n_rows":82,"n_cols":9,"rows_kept":82,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[26,1,30,1],[26,3,26,7],[28,3,28,7],[29,3,29,7],[30,3,30,7],[18,3,18,7],[19,3,19,7],[20,3,20,7],[76,3,76,7],[78,3,78,7],[58,3,58,7],[56,3,56,7],[57,5,57,6],[70,3,70,7],[69,3,69,7],[68,3,68,7],[66,3,66,7],[21,3,21,7],[23,3,23,7],[43,3,43,7],[42,4,42,7],[81,0,81,1],[81,2,81,8],[35,3,35,7],[36,3,36,7],[31,3,31,7],[33,3,33,7],[34,3,34,7],[51,3,51,7],[53,3,53,7],[45,3,45,7],[79,3,79,7],[80,3,80,7],[38,3,38,7],[39,3,39,7],[40,3,40,7],[41,3,41,7],[8,3,8,7],[9,3,9,7],[10,3,10,7],[11,3,11,7],[15,3,15,7],[14,3,14,7],[44,3,44,7],[71,3,71,7],[46,3,46,7],[55,3,55,7],[54,3,54,7],[50,3,50,7],[49,3,49,7],[48,3,48,7],[60,3,60,7],[59,3,59,7],[65,3,65,7],[67,5,67,7],[73,3,73,7],[74,3,74,7],[75,3,75,7],[61,3,61,7],[63,3,63,7],[64,3,64,7],[21,0,35,0],[6,1,10,1],[2,1,2,7],[3,1,3,7],[11,1,15,1],[16,1,20,1],[6,0,20,0],[21,1,25,1],[31,1,35,1],[6,3,6,7],[13,3,13,7],[32,4,32,6],[24,3,24,7],[25,3,25,7],[12,4,12,7],[16,3,16,7],[66,8,80,8],[56,8,65,8],[36,8,55,8],[21,8,35,8],[6,8,20,8],[61,1,65,1],[66,1,70,1],[56,0,65,0],[71,1,75,1],[66,0,80,0],[76,1,80,1],[41,1,45,1],[46,1,50,1],[51,1,55,1],[36,0,55,0],[56,1,60,1],[36,1,40,1]]}
["Tool #5. Management analysis"]
[]
["Principal organisation(s)"]
["Agent organisation(s)"]
["Element","Sub-element",null,"Aligned for learning","Aligned for selection","Aligned for access","Aligned for process compliance","Aligned for patronage and/or specific interest groups","Description of element"]
[null,null,"Notes","Relationship is aligned around the goal of all children learning. Clear goals for learning are articulated, financed, and supported. ","These \"filtration\" systems use exam scores and signalling to select a minority of top-performing children who will graduate and win a place at university, or in the labor market.","These systems focus on expansion (getting all kids in school), and there is an emphasis on enrolment and grade attainment/level completion. While these systems may talk about \"quality\", it is usually not defined in relationship to learning outcomes, and is instead connected to a laundry list of \"thin\" inputs (i.e., things measured by EMIS) as opposed to teaching and learning practices in the classroom. ","Relationship is dominated by a focus on completing logistical tasks like keeping to scheduled activities and meeting reporting targets. While these may have originally served a purpose, they are now bureaucratic compliance for the sake of compliance. The technical core and purpose is weak or lost all together, and instead the relationship is dominated by support functions (e.g., human resources, information technology, or procurement). While process compliance is sometimes the means through which systems pursue selection or access goals, it can also be its own self-fulfilling purpose (\"We do it because that's what we do\"). ","Relationship is aligned for a purpose other than education.  In patronage systems, politicians and those in power use the system as a patronage mill (e.g., to hire teachers, or to build schools for certain constituencies). Often, those who have enough resources will opt out of the public system (resulting in a large low-cost private school sector). \nIn systems aligned for specific interest groups, the dominant priority is fulfilling narrow elements of particular interest groups (e.g. profits of textbook producers, or the employment/wage concerns of teacher's unions as distinct from their legitimate role as professional organizations in promoting good education). This system pretends to be another type on paper, but de facto does not deliver schooling or learning for all.","Bullet point or short narrative description of the overall alignment of this element (delegation, finance, information, motivation, support).\n\nNote: draft a preliminary description during the desk review, and update the description after the workshops / interviews have been completed."]
["Delegation","Management-Delegation (i)\n\nWhat are the high-level targets and most important responsibilities that education authorities prioritise?","Guiding questions","What are the education authority's revealed (de facto) priorities for the education system? \nWhat would a successful school/teacher look like to the education authorities? \nWhat areas / departments / etc. of the education authority are seen as the most respected or influential within the organisation(s)?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Priority is given to clear goals for learning progress of all children throughout the school cycle.\n\n• There is also a focus on teaching (i.e., the quality of classroom interactions), not only on the number of teachers and their formal qualifications. \n\n• The most respected departments or functions within the ministry relate to the technical core (e.g., the curriculum department, the teacher professional development division, the school inspectorate) rather than support functions (e.g., HR, legal, EMIS).","• Targets relate to exam scores, and high pass rates in exam years are the ultimate goal. The system focuses on selection into higher levels of schooling, especially tertiary. There may be less concern about dropout rates than in access-oriented systems.\n \n• Attention to student learning is often a case of ‘too little, too late, for too few’.\n\n• The most respected departments or functions within the ministry include those who control credentialling and progression (e.g., the examinations board, the public university admissions office, etc.).","• Targets prioritse maximising enrolment and attainment at ever higher levels of schooling.\n\n• Enrolment levels and progression rates are the ultimate goal that frontline providers are expected to pursue. \n\n• There is a focus on meeting minimum required inputs, as measured in EMIS. This includes a focus on the number of teachers and their on-paper qualifications, rather than on the quality of teaching in practice.  \n\n• Support functions such as HR may hold the greatest authority within the ministry.","• Rule compliance is the highest priority. All risk is perceived as compliance risk (e.g., not doing X will risk failing to comply with a given rule, rather than not doing X will risk failing to improve children's learning). \n\n• There is a focus on frontline compliance with procedural standards (e.g., teacher attendance, documentation that curriculum is being followed), often evidenced through large amounts of paperwork (physical or digital).\n\n• The greatest authority within the ministry is held by support functions (e.g., HR, finance, procurement).","• The priorities of a favored group dominate, and unwritten goals often focus on rewarding favored groups. \n\n• Priorities may shift frequently with shifts in political power or coalitions.\n\n• The greatest authority within the ministry may be held by support functions (particularly HR), which are as tools for dispensing patronage. Often, there is a focus on teacher assignment and transfers as a mode of rewarding teachers/dispensing patronage. "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Management-Delegation (ii)\n\nHow aligned are curriculum, exams, and students' learning levels?","Guiding questions","To what extent are the topics and expected mastery levels of curricular standards and national exams aligned with each other? To what extent are both of these aligned with the current learning levels and learning needs across the full spectrum of students? \nWhat priorities do education authorities set for the curriculum?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Curriculum is aligned with the current learning level of students (or schools/teachers are empowered to tailor instruction to current student learning levels). Curricular standards progress at a pace that children can follow, mastering current material before lessons move on to new content.\n\n• Priority is given to universal, early conceptual and procedural mastery of foundational skills, as a baseline standard that all children should benefit from.","• Priority is given to curriculum completion. The curriculum may be poorly calibrated to the needs of most children, such that many children fall behind the curriculum long before they reach exam years. Once they fall behind, most stay behind because there is little remediation available to help them catch up in terms of meaningful mastery of curricular content. \n\n• Exams have high stakes for the students, and are used to select which students progress to the next levels of education and/or which students gain entry into desirable schools or educational streams.\n\nAdditional indicator for selection systems:\n• If there is a gap between curricular standards and exam requirements, the de facto reality is that classroom and school priorities are driven by the exam rather than the curriculum.\n\nAdditional indicator for process-compliance systems:\n• Curricular standards may be isomorphic copies of curricula from other contexts, regardless of whether these standards are appropriate and beneficial for the children in this context."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Management-Delegation (iii)\n\nSpider vs. starfish: local discretion granted to schools/ teachers","Guiding questions","How do education authorities at the centre relate to service providers at the frontline?\nHow do education authorities respond to innovation that occurs at the frontline? \nDoes the system function as a \"spider\", where all decisions are taken at the centre, or as a \"starfish\", where different parts of frontlines are able to move independently to suit their contexts?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Schools/teachers are offered a solid foundation of pedagogical practices (which may be tightly structured at low levels of teacher capability), but are then empowered to act as learning, innovative agents.\n\n• Schools/teachers are empowered agents in decisions that optimise the school/classroom for local needs and/or are best informed by thick local knowledge (e.g., teachers can choose the pedagogical techniques that best suit their students' needs in conjunction with systemwide learning goals/core curricular expectations).\n\n• Innovation occurs. If an innovation improves children's learning, it is valued by the system.","• The relationship between education authorities and schools is strictly hierarchical, governed by rigid rules and reporting procedures.\n\n• There are logistical management structures: all schools and teachers are expected to deliver similar classroom lessons at similar times in similar ways. However, authorities may informally encourage deviations from the standard curricular progression if they favour test preparation (e.g., replacing application-oriented lessons with practice test sessions).\n\n• Innovation occurs, and it is valued by the system if it increases test scores. ","• The relationship between education authorities and schools is strictly hierarchical, governed by rigid rules and reporting procedures.\n\n• There are logistical management structures: all schools and teachers are expected to deliver similar classroom lessons at similar times in similar ways.\n\n• Innovation occurs, and it is valued by the system if it increases enrolment or attainment.","• The relationship between education authorities and schools is strictly hierarchical, governed by rigid rules and reporting procedures.\n\n• There are logistical management structures: all schools and teachers are expected to deliver similar classroom lessons at similar times in similar ways.\n\n• Innovation is suppressed because it is seen as too risky. There is little upside to risk-taking since high performance is not valued (only compliance with procedure), and there is little downside risk to failure (since bad outcomes, like children not learning, are seen as beyond the control or remit of schools/teachers as long as they follow procedure)","• The relationship between education authorities and schools is strictly hierarchical, governed by rigid rules and reporting procedures.\n\n• There are logistical management structures: all schools and teachers are expected to deliver similar classes at similar times in similar ways. However, monitoring and enforcement may be weak.\n\n• Response to innovation depends on how it affects favored group. "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Finance","Management-Finance (i)\n\nHow is the financing of non-teacher inputs to schools structured and monitored?","Guiding questions","How are decisions and rules about financing inputs to schools structured? What factors do they take into account? \nHow are decisions and allocations in finance justified and reported on? Are they on the basis of thin \"accounting\" only, or do thick \"accounts\" also matter?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Decisions and rules about for allocating finances for inputs are justified based on how they will directly or indirectly contribute to student learning.\n\n• Spending is monitored not only through quantitative \"accounting\", but also through narrative \"accounts\" that justify the contribution of these outlays to student learning targets. \n\n• Over time, experimentation with different financing strategies leads to organisational learning about how to achieve learning objectives.","• Decisions and rules for allocating finances for inputs are justified based on their relationship to exam scores. Allocations may be skewed toward higher levels of schooling.\n\n• Spending is monitored primarily through quantitative \"accounting\".\n\n•If there is any financial experimentation, it is concentrated on raising scores and tertiary enrolment.","• Decisions and rules for allocating finances for inputs are justified based on how they will directly or indirectly contribute to student enrolment and attendance.\n\n• Spending is monitored only on  resources spent without justification based on performance measures.\n\n• If there is any financial experimentation, it is concentrated on expanding enrolment and attainments ","• Financal processes focus is on compliance with existing rules, with no relationship to outcomes.\n\n• Spending is monitored primarily through quantitative \"accounting\".\n\n• There is limited or no financial experimentation. Any experimentation that does happen tends to be isomorphic replication of policies from elsewhere, which are evaluated on fidelity of implementation rather than on improvements to outcomes for children. ","• The rules driving financial allocations are weak. Discretionary inputs, whether money or in-kind resources, may differ significantly by region based on political priorities.\n\n• There is little effort at either maintaining consistent standardised \"accounting\" or meaningful justificatory \"accounts\" of spending."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"\n\nManagement-Finance (ii)\n\nHow is teacher compensation structured and financed?","Guiding questions","How is budget line for teachers’ salaries structured? What factors does it take into account? \nWhen was the last time a change was made to teacher salary structure (compensation of existing teachers or hiring of new ones)? What was the basis for this change?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Teacher compensation packages (including base pay, pensions, and incentives) are structured to attract, select, retain, and motivate good teaching that cultivates student learning throughout a teacher's career. \n\n• If there is a major change in systemwide priorities for student learning, this may result in a change to the teacher compensation structure.","• Rules driving teacher compensation packages may be tilted toward higher levels of schooling and exam years. For example, teachers in exam years or upper secondary school may be paid much more (or rank much higher in civil service salary grades) than teachers in the foundational years of primary school.\n\n• The structure of teacher spending determined by the generic civil service compensation scheme.","• Rules driving teacher compensation packaages are based on having enough teachers to maximise student enrolment. \n\n• The structure of teacher spending determined by the generic civil service compensation scheme. The amount allocated to teacher spending is determined enrolment levels.\n\n• There may be a large number of minimally trained teachers who are hired on temporary, low-paying contracts to fill teacher shortages.","• Rules driving teacher compensation packages focus on compliance. Any variation in teacher compensation is driven by generic, standardised factors such as paper qualifications and years of service.\n\n• The structure of teacher spending determined by the generic civil service compensation scheme.","• Rules driving teacher compensation packages have little relationship to education goals (either learning, exam scores, or enrolment).\n\n• Changes to the compensation structure or to hiring targets are determined by short-term objectives that are unrelated to learning goals. \n\n •Teacher allocations differ by region, depending on the political salience of each region."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Management-Finance (iii)\n\nSpider vs. starfish: How is disrection over budget allocations distributed between education authorities and mid-tier / frontline actors?","Guiding questions","In making financial decisions, does the education ministry act like a \"spider\", where all decisions are taken centrally, or a \"starfish\", where lower levels of the system (e.g., frontline, districts, etc) have some discretion ofver budget allocations?\nWhen the state disburses resources, do schools and districts mostly receive flexible budget lines or in-kind resources that were procured centrally?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• While there may be centralised funding, schools / districts / etc. have some autonomy and discretion to allocate funds in ways that will better serve systemwide learning goals in their particular contexts.","• Both the provision and the allocation of funds is centralised. \n\n• Nearly all finance is provided in-kind, with no discretion over how to spend it. For example, rather than receiving a budget line for textbooks, the district office may receive a shipment of textbooks that was centrally commissioned by the ministry.",null,null,"• While there may be centralised funding, politically favoured local actors may have discretion over the allocation of funds. In some cases, these local actors may be party- or union-affiliated school leaders. In others, they may be local party leaders who exert unofficial control over local schools."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Information","Management-Information (i)\n\nEMIS: Which priorities are emphasised within the Education Management Information System?","Guiding questions","What information is included in the EMIS system? \nHow do education authorities use this information? "]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• The most critical information in the system is monitoring of learning outcomes at all levels of schooling.\n\n• There is likely also an EMIS system focused on enrolment and inputs.","• The most critical information in the system is monitoring exam scores and pass rates on school-leaving exams.\n\n•There is likely also an EMIS system focused on enrolment and inputs.","• The most critical information in the system is enrolment and attainment data. \n\n• EMIS focuses on monitoring inputs (including enrolment) and compliance with processes related to schooling. ","• EMIS Information is gathered to monitor policy compliance.\n\n• Collecting information for monitoring and compliance is extremely important—to the point that it becomes one of the chief responsibilities of the lower tiers in the system and one of the main ways they interact with the higher tiers.","• Information gathering is sporadic, with limited tracking of how inputs are allocated.\n\n• If there is an EMIS, it is likely of low quality."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Management-Information (ii)\n\nExams: How are exams designed, and what is their main purpose?","Guiding questions","What is the main purpose of exams?\nHow are the exams in the system designed? What do they emphasise? How closely aligned are exams and the curriculum?\nNote: See also Voice & Choice-Information (i) for more guiding questions related to the regularity, reliability, and relevance of standardised tests as experienced by children, families, and communities."]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• While there may be a high stakes, late-stage exam, equal priority is given to monitoring system-level performance through good standardised tests that start in primary school. \n• Teachers are provided with multiple tools for formative assessment that allow them to regularly understand and respond to their students' levels of learning. \n\n• Exams measure conceptual and procedural mastery of topics. Teaching to the test is therefore harder and there is less of it. \n• Assessment results are not overly high-stakes for students or teachers, and provide reliable information. Cheating is difficult and rare.\n\n• Test results feed back into the system and are used to track and improve performance. This happens at a high level for planning and systems monitoring, but also at a classroom level where teachers use assessment to adjust their teaching. ","• Priority is placed on high-stakes, late-stage examinations with the primary purpose of selection for progression to subsequent stages of education. There are less likely to be formative assessments.\n\n• Exams may measure mastery of topics at relatively low levels of depth - especially memorisation - rather than at deeper levels of conceptual and procedural mastery (such as application of knowledge to a novel situation).  When high stakes exams ask for rote memorization it encourages bad teaching focused on test prep.   \n• High-stakes-for-the-student exams create strong perverse incentives to cheat. \n\n• Results do not feed back into the system, or are not used to track and improve systemwide or classroom-level performance."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Management-Information (iii)\n\nAccounts vs. accounting: How is information about school leaders' and teachers' performance structured?","Guiding questions","What types of performance information are school leaders and teachers required to submit to education authorities and organisations? \nWhat sort of information do school inspectors/district officials/et al. focus on when they conduct school visits?\nDoes this information extend beyond thin \"accounting\" (e.g., student test scores, or value-added measures based on test scores) toward thick \"accounts\"? (Fpr more on thin/thick and accounting/accounts, see the glossary and/or Honig & Pritchett, 2019).\nHow is this information used?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Information collected about school leadership and teacher performance provides \"accounts\" (i.e., thick descriptions, that explain context-specific decisions oriented toward systemwide goals). This often occurs through processes such as school inspections, district monitoring of schools, well-structured but open-ended appraisals of teachers by school leaders or district-level coaches, etc. \n\n• These processes place priority on measuring the quality of teaching, including through information about teaching practices in classrooms and student assessments.\n\n• This \"thick\" information is valued in addition to \"thin\" student test scores.","• Information collected about school leadership and teacher performance provides \"accounting\" (i.e., thin, standardised metrics, like the school's pass rate on the trial exam).\n\n• These information flows place priority on measuring student examination scores, which can lead to inefficiency and inequity.","• Information collected about school leadership and teacher performance provides \"accounting\" (i.e., thin standardised metrics, like generic and un-benchmarked performance teacher evaluation scores, or the number of new students recruited to enrol in the school).\n\n• These information flows place priority on measuring thin, EMIS-visible indicators (such as teacher qualifications unconnected to actual teaching performance). ","• Information collected about school leadership and teacher performance provides \"accounting\" (i.e., thin standardised metrics, like a checklist of tasks that school leaders are supposed to complete, or school inspectors simply checking whether teachers recorded their lesson plans in the required format rather observing lessons and discussing them with teachers).","• Limited information is collected about the performance of school leaders and teachers. Any such information is in the form of \"accounting\", not \"accounts\"."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Management-Information (iv)\n\nInformation use: How is information used by education authorities?","Guiding questions","To what extent do education authorities use information from schools and classrooms to shape their decisions?\nIs the flow of information between the frontline and the centre one-way, or does it flow both ways?\nAre there meaningful feedback loops in the system that allow decisions and educational practices to be improved iteratively?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Information (inspections, district monitoring, test scores, exams) is used to make learning-oriented decisions (as evidenced in financing, motivation, and support).\n\n• Decisions about what information to collect involve input from the lower (district/school) levels of the system. Information is collected and fed up to inform decision making at the top, but also shared back down in local-level feedback loops.","• Information (inspections, district monitoring, test scores, exams) is used to make decisions aimed at raising test scores (as evidenced in financing, motivation, and support).\n\n• Decisions about what information to collect are made at the top. Information is collected and fed up to inform decision making at the top but rarely shared back down.","• Information (inspections, district monitoring, test scores, exams) is used to make decisions aimed at expanding enrolment or attainment (as evidenced in financing, motivation, and support).\n\n• Decisions about what information to collect are made at the top. Information is collected and fed up to inform decision making at the top but rarely shared back down.                            ","• Information is used to enforce process compliance. Isomorphic policies or programmed are judged successful based on whether the paperwork documenting their implementation was properly compiled. (For example, school inspectors may check teachers' lesson plan record books rather than observing any classroom lessons.)\n\n• The information that is gathered is rately used to make decisions that impact schools, teachers, or students.\n\n•Decisions about what information to collect are made at the top. Information is collected and fed upward but rarely shared back down.   ","• Information (inspections, district monitoring, test scores, exams) may not be aggregated and reported. Even if it is, it likely is not used to make decisions. "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Motivation","Management-Motivation (i)\n\nIntrinsic factors: What are the professional and psychosocial benefits of fulfilling education authorities' expecations of teachers?","Guiding questions","What is the professional status of the teaching profession? \nHow strong are professional norms among teachers, and what do these norms emphasise?\nWhat are the most common reasons for a young graduate wishing to enter the teaching profession?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Teaching is a high-status, purpose-driven profession. Teachers take pride in the pedagogical skills and content knowledge that they acquire through pre-service and in-service professional development.\n\n• There are strong professional and social norms around teaching. Teachers who do the bare minimum may be subject to social sanctions from their colleagues.\n\n• In many schools, there is an established practice of more senior teachers formally and informally mentoring their novice colleagues.","• The status of the teaching profession is based on the fact that teachers hold relatively advanced formal qualifications. Those who teach exam years or higher levels of education enjoy more prestige than their colleagues in the foundational years of primary school.\n\n• Professional and social norms are oriented toward exam performance. Teachers may view it as acceptable or even desirable to pay the most attention to high-scoring children.\n\n• The most desirable positions in the education bureaucracy may not be those focused on classroom teaching. ","• Teaching is a relatively low-status profession (perhaps a \"profession of last resort\" among graduates unable to obtain more lucrative jobs).\n\n• Teachers are largely treated as interchangeable civil servants (any other civil servant could do their job, and they could be assigned to a job outside the classroom or in another sector). Teachers are often assigned administrative tasks unrelated to teaching. \n\n• Professional and social norms are weak. Teachers may be more likely to ostracise colleagues who work \"too hard\" than colleagues who do the bare minimum.\n\n• The most desirable positions in the education bureaucracy are not those focused on teaching. For example, administrative positions may be more desirable. ",null,"• Teaching jobs and promotion opportunities allocated based on group membership or patronage, not rules or merit.\n\n• Performance as a teacher  -and even formal qualifications unrelated to peformance - are not important for securing teacher jobs. \n\n• Professional norms are weak (e.g. there is limited attention to rule following).  Social norms about teachers are also  undermined (e.g. teaching jobs are regarded as sinecures, not respectable professional jobs) "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Management-Motivation (ii)\n\nExtrinsic factors: What are the material or positional benefits of fulfilling eduation authorities' expectations of teachers?","Guiding questions","What factors determine a teacher's progression through the career and compensation structure?\nIf a teacher wanted a promotion, a higher salary, or a more desirable assignment (e.g., teaching at a \"good\" urban school), what would they do to?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Decisions related to individual teachers' career progressions are based on teachers' contributions to student learning (not just seniority). Assignments to schools, grades, subjects, or classes are based on which teachers are best placed to help specific groups of children thrive. \n\n• Career progression decisions do not compromise teachers' intrinsic motivation or professional norms (e.g., relying not only on exam scores but on \"thick\" appraisals/assessments of how well they are serving their students; ensuring that any competition between teachers is appropriate in the sociocultural context).\n\n• Teachers who wish to advance financially or positionally are most likely to achieve this if they prioritise student learning.","• Decisions related to individual teachers' career progressions are based on information related to thin indicators (especially seniority), with some positive or negative consequences tied to how their students perform in high-stakes exams. \n\n• Teachers who wish to advance financially or positionally are most likely to achieve this if they intensively coach their students on test-taking techniques and/or lobby to be assigned to higher-performing schools/classes in exam years.","• Decisions related to individual teachers' career progressions are made based on information related to thin indicators from (especially seniority).\n\n• Teachers who wish to advance financially or positionally may have few options for increasing their chances. However, volunteering to teach in hard-to-staff schools may offer a fast track to a higher salary scale or leadership positions.","• Decisions related to individual teachers' career progressions are made based on information related to thin indicators (especially seniority). There may be particular attention to teachers' formal qualifications. \n\n• Teachers who wish to advance financially or positionally are more likely to do so if they acquire additional qualifications, regardless of whether these qualifications help them improve their classroom practice.","• Decisions related to individual teachers' career progressions may be based on information related to thin indicators from EMIS and budget data. However, these considerations may frequently be overridden by political priorities (e.g., hiring underqualified teachers who are affiliated with certain political parties or organisatoins; or reassigning large numbers of teachers to the home district of the newly elected president).\n\n• Teachers who wish to advance financially or positionally are more likely to do so if they cultivate relationships with politically powerful individuals or affiations with politically powerful organisations."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Support","Management-Support (i)\n\nInstructional materials: How effective are instructional materials that are available to schools and teachers?","Guiding questions","What types of instructional materials (textbooks, workbooks, teachers' guides, assessment question banks, manipulatives, posters, etc) are available? How good are they in terms of quality?\nHow closely do these instructional materials correspond to the curriculum? To exams? To teachers' and children's needs?\nDo teachers and school leaders have any choice of instructional materials? (For example, if the default textbook does not suit the needs of the students in a particular school or classroom, are alternatives available? If so, can these alternatives be procured through government systems using government funds, or will teachers need to use their own money or raise money from families to do so?)"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Instructional materials are high-quality and aligned with each other (e.g., between workbooks and textbooks). They are also aligned with curricular standards, are are developmentally appropriate for the learning needs of the children in question.\n\n• Teachers and school leaders have an adequate amount of choice of instructional materials. For example, each school may receive a per-child allocation for teaching and learning support materials that can be selected from a pre-approved list; or there may be a vibrant commercial market for relatively affordable and government-approved instructional materials.","• Instructional materials may be aligned with the curriculum and/or with exams. However, they are likely to emphasise the transmission of large quantities of content or the mastery of repetitive procedural skills rather than meaningful conceptual and procedural mastery.  \n\n• The education ministry may only provide a single definitive textbook for each subject in each grade. This textbook (and other instructional materials) is likely to be targeted toward academically privileged children, with little attention to/learning activities oriented toward children who need remediation support. There may be a vibrant commercial market for sample exams and other text prep materials.","• Instructional materials are low-quality (e.g., inappropriate for children's levels of cognitive development, poorly written or poorly translated), and/or misaligned with each other (e.g., the textbook and the teachers' guide are mismatched).\n\n• Schools and teachers may face disruptive gaps in the distribution of instructional materials. For example, even if the curriculum changes, schools may not receive deliveries of the new textbook until many months later (despite being expected to deliver the new curriculum throughout). If there is a significant commercial market for instructional materials, the ministry has little interest in monitoring the quality of these materials."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Management-Support (ii)\n\nPre-service training: To what extent does pre-service teacher education serve  systemwide goals?","Guiding questions","What types of pre-service teacher education are available? \nWhat are the main pedagogical skills or bodies of knowledge knowledge emphasised in pre-service education?\nHow much classroom teaching experience do candidates receive during pre-service teacher education? \nHow much classroom experience do pre-service teacher education lecturers typically have?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• There are different pre-service qualifications appropriate for different teaching roles (e.g., for different levels of schooling, different subjects, different subgroups of children with distinct needs).\n\n• Pre-service teacher education is aligned with expectations for student learning as reflected in curriculum and assessments. Teachers are equipped to differentiate instruction to students' learning levels.\n\n• There is a strong practicum component, offering significant classroom experience and feedback from experienced teachers.","• Pre-service teacher qualifications are likely to be standardised (rather than specialised to different teaching roles). \n\n• Pre-service teacher education does not equip teachers to tailor instruction to students' learning levels. \n\n• Pre-service training is largely theoretical. There may may be a practicum component, but it is likely to be treated as a box-ticking exercise rather than a meaningful apprenticeship in the craft of teaching. Pre-service candidates are rarely assigned to exam-year classes for their practicum.","• During periods when student enrolment is expanding rapidly, the ministry may approve alternative, shorter modalities of pre-service teacher education. \n\n• Pre-service training is largely theoretical. There may may be a practicum component, but it is likely to be treated as a box-ticking exercise rather than a meaningful apprenticeship in the craft of teaching.\n\n• Lecturers at pre-service teacher education institutes may lack appropriate classroom experience. Instead, they may have been hired simply based on their formal qualifications.","• Pre-service teacher qualifications for entering teaching profession are standardised and strongly enforced. \n\n• Pre-service training is largely theoretical. There may may be a practicum component, but it is likely to be treated as a box-ticking exercise rather than a meaningful apprenticeship in the craft of teaching.\n\n• Lecturers at pre-service teacher education institutes may lack appropriate classroom experience. Instead, they may have been hired simply based on their formal qualifications.","• Pre-service teacher qualifications for entering teaching profession are standardised and strongly enforced. \n\n• Pre-service training is largely theoretical. There may may be a practicum component, but it is likely to be treated as a box-ticking exercise rather than a meaningful apprenticeship in the craft of teaching.\n\n• Lecturers at pre-service teacher education institutes may lack appropriate classroom experience. Instead, they may have been hired simply based on their formal qualifications."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Management-Support (iii)\n\nIn-service training: To what extent does in-service teacher education serve  systemwide goals?","Guiding questions","What types of in-service teacher training is available?\nTo what extent does teacher training involve hands-on, continuous practice and coaching, as compared to a lecture-style, one-off cascade model?\nHow does the teacher training on offer relate to the curriculum? To exams? To teachers' and children's needs?\nIs teacher training provided in a centrally controlled (\"spider\") modality, or do districts / schools / teachers have some discretion to choose the training that best meets local needs (\"starfish\")?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• In-service training is aligned with expectations for student learning as reflected in curriculum, exams, instructional materials, and the need to tailor instruction to student's learning levels      \n\n• The typical in-service training approach is characterised by the hands-on practice, coaching, and mentorship that facilitate adult learning and application. Training may be delivered through horizontal professional networks.\n\n• In-service training is offered in response to identified, localised needs in the quality of teaching or learning. Districts, schools, and/or teachers may have the discretion to select between trainings on offer.","• In-service teacher training occurs regularly, but it may overemphasise exams. It is incoherent with either the curriculum or the need to tailor instruction to students' learning levels. \n\n• In-service training is done in response to needs identified on the basis of exam scores (e.g. national low pass rates in a certain subject), or changes to the exam format. Training is not linked with localised information about teaching or learning outcomes. \n\n• The typical in-service training approach is a cascade model of one-off sessions away from classroom settings that generally have little impact on teaching practice.","• In-service teacher training occurs periodically, but quality is not of primary importance. It is likely to be incoherent with other parts of the system, in particular the curriculum, exams, and the need to tailor instruction to students' learning levels.\n\n• Standardised (rather than locally tailored) in-service teacher training modules may be rolled out across the entire education system.\n\n• The typical in-service training approach is a cascade model of one-off sessions away from classroom settings that generally have little impact on teaching practice.","• In-service teacher training occurs periodically, but quality is not of primary importance.\n\n• If districts or schools have discretion to procure their own in-service training, a driving factor in this procurement is efficiently meeting annual requirements for in-service professional development hours for each teacher.\n\n• The typical in-service training approach is a cascade model of one-off sessions away from classroom settings that generally have little impact on teaching practice\n\n","• In-service teacher training may not occur regularly.\n\n• Teachers may occasionally be required to attend in-service training sessions that in fact emphasise certain political or interest-group agendas."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Overall description of the Management relationship\n\nPossible questions to consider: \n- Overall what is the dominant goal that the relationship is aligned with?\n- How much alignment or misalignment is there between the elements? Are the elements aligned toward the same goals or different goals? \n- Are there de jure and de facto gaps between the elements? (e.g., Delegation defines success or quality in a certain way de jure, but there is no Information collected about it de facto.) "]

{"sheet":"Tool #6 Voice & Choice analysis","index":6,"n_rows":52,"n_cols":8,"rows_kept":52,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[2,1,2,6],[3,1,3,6],[32,3,32,4],[32,5,32,6],[12,3,12,4],[12,5,12,6],[6,3,6,6],[8,3,8,6],[9,3,9,6],[10,3,10,6],[6,1,10,1],[30,3,30,6],[11,1,15,1],[18,3,18,6],[19,3,19,6],[20,3,20,6],[16,1,20,1],[42,5,42,6],[39,3,39,6],[40,3,40,6],[51,0,51,1],[51,2,51,7],[42,3,42,4],[43,3,43,6],[41,7,50,7],[50,3,50,6],[46,3,46,6],[6,0,20,0],[21,0,30,0],[31,0,40,0],[41,0,50,0],[33,3,33,6],[46,1,50,1],[41,3,41,6],[41,1,45,1],[36,3,36,6],[36,1,40,1],[44,3,44,6],[45,3,45,6],[48,3,48,6],[49,3,49,6],[26,1,30,1],[21,1,25,1],[37,3,37,4],[37,5,37,6],[35,3,35,6],[31,3,31,6],[23,3,23,6],[24,3,24,6],[25,3,25,6],[28,3,28,6],[27,5,27,6],[21,3,21,6],[34,3,34,6],[31,1,35,1],[6,7,20,7],[21,7,30,7],[31,7,40,7],[16,3,16,6],[11,3,11,6],[38,3,38,6],[29,3,29,6],[26,3,26,6],[13,3,13,6],[14,3,14,6],[15,3,15,6]]}
["Tool #6. Voice & Choice analysis"]
[]
["Principal organisation(s)"]
["Agent organisation(s)/group(s)"]
["Element","Sub-element",null,"Aligned for learning","Aligned for selection","Aligned for access","Aligned for patronage and/or specific interest groups","Description of element"]
[null,null,"Notes","Relationship is aligned around the goal of all children learning. These types of systems have cohesive voice that advocates for learning for all.","These \"filtration\" systems use exam scores and signalling to select a minority of top-performing children who will graduate and win a place at university, or in the labor market. Voice is often less cohesive and representative than in systems aligned to learning. Voice is primarily a tool of the middle class (only certain schools, blocks of parents, or individual parents exercise it). Selection systems push parents to care about doing relatively better than others within the country (even if learning little by absolute standards).","These systems focus on expansion (getting all kids in school), and there is an emphasis on enrolment and grade attainment/level completion. While these systems may talk about \"quality\", it is usually not defined in relationship to learning outcomes, and is instead connected to a laundry list of \"thin\" inputs (i.e., things measured by EMIS) as opposed to teaching and learning practices in the classroom. There is little need for voice or any local discretion in most of these systems. ","Relationship is aligned for a purpose other than education.  In patronage systems, politicians and those in power use the system as a patronage mill (e.g., to hire teachers, or to build schools for certain constituencies). Often, those who have enough resources will opt out of the public system (resulting in a large low-cost private school sector). \nIn systems aligned for specific interest groups, the dominant priority is fulfilling narrow elements of particular interest groups (e.g. profits of textbook producers, or the employment/wage concerns of teacher's unions as distinct from their legitimate role as professional organizations in promoting good education). This system pretends to be another type on paper, but de facto does not deliver schooling or learning for all.","Bullet point or short narrative description of the overall alignment of this element (delegation, information, finance, motivation).\n\nNote: draft a preliminary description during the desk review, and update the description after the workshops / interviews have been completed."]
["Delegation","Voice & Choice-Delegation (i)\n\nWhat do families want? ","Guiding questions","What do parents prioritse and demand in education for their children?\nIn the wider environment, what factors affect children's long-term wellbeing and success, and how do these factors affect families' educational priorities?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Voice: In setting goals for schools, families prioritse student learning. Goals relate to improving learning for all grades (not just grades with high-stakes exams), and for the entire distribution of students (not just those at the top, or near pass/fail thresholds).\n\n• Choice: Families prioritse student learning when choosing schools. Private (and competitive public) schools compete on learning. \n\n• In the wider environment:  Learning is a key factor in success on the job market and later in life. Opportunities for entering a good university or getting a good job are awarded based on skills (which are sometimes, but not always, reflected in test scores). ","•Voice: families prioritise scores on high-stakes exams used for promotion to the next educational level. Goals focus on exam pass rates and on improving the performance of students who get high marks,  or students who are near an important test score threshold.\n\n• Choice: Families prioritise test scores or related signals when choosing schools. Private schools compete on test scores (e.g., through selective admissions or off-rolling low-scoring students), or signal they are the \"right\" type of school through other proxies for success (e.g., the socio-economic makeup of the student body, or the language of instruction).  There is widespread tutoring that is focused on test prep in grades close to high stakes examinations.\n\n• Wider environment:  Scarce opportunities in universities or the labor market are awarded based on test scores or similar signals.  ","• Notions of \"quality\" schooling are defined by thin inputs (e.g., enrolment, attendance, dropout / repetition rates, distance to school, school infrastructure, textbooks, level of financing). \n\n• Voice: Families prioritise (ease of) access to schooling and increasing levels of thin inputs.\n\n• Choice: Families prioritse input levels to choose schools. Private schools compete on inputs (e.g., quality of school infrastructure).  As the public system expands to be more inclusive, this may make the signalling value of going to public school less valuable, causing richer or otherwise advantaged families to exit to private schools.  \n\n• Wider environment: Centrally set goals focus on enrolment, attainment, and inputs. Scarce opportunities in universities or the labor market are awarded based on credentials.","• Voice: Either families rarely exercise voice, or the exercise of voice does not prioritse education.\n\n• Choice: If they can, families have opted out of public schools. There is likely a large low-cost private sector.\n\n• Wider environment: The de facto function of the education system is building school infrastructure and/or providing jobs. Scarce opportunities in universities or the labor market are awarded based on connections."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Voice & Choice-Delegation (ii)\n\nStrength of voice: \nDoes voice have a meaningful role in governing schools?","Guiding questions","To what extent do families and communities influence the vision of local schools?\nTo what extent can families and communities influence the strategies that local schools adopt to meet systemwide educational goals?\nWhat are the main responsibilities of school management committees? How do SMCs' responsibilities on paper differ from their responsibilities in practice?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Strong voice.\n\n• There is some degree of selectively distributed authority in the system. While there may be centrally set educational goals and standards, there is significant local discretion granted to lower tiers of the system (e.g., districts or schools) on how to meet those goals. Districts or schools may also have the discretion to set additional local goals. The community is engaged in public schools, and public school leaders are responsive to community concerns.\n\n• Voice has a meaningful role in setting goals for local schools, and providing a high-level check on whether a school is making progress toward these goals. Voice may also have influence over selecting or replacing school leadership.\n ",null,"• Weak voice.\n\n• Public schools are perceived as belonging to the bureaucracy and parents/communities are seen as passive recipients of education services.  There is little discretion at lower tiers of the system (i.e., district level or below) over how to pursue centrally set educational goals and standards. De jure powers given to Voice may also be hamstrung through indirect means such as non-implementation, lack of training, or under-resourcing.\n\n• If voice is active, the responsibilities assigned to it often involve day-to-day operations rather than setting and monitoring high-level goals. Voice often functions as an extension of the bureaucracy, supervising small implementation tasks (e.g., monitoring teacher attendance, deciding whether the capitation grant should be used to replace broken windows)."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Voice & Choice-Delegation (iii)\n\nInclusivity of voice:\nWhose voices matter? To what degree is there cohesive voice that is broadly representative of the community?","Guiding questions","Which groups or individuals have a say in the education system? Which groups or individuals are most prominent?\nHow do priorities differ across groups? "]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• The voice of families and community members is channelled through representatives—whether official representatives (e.g., school committees, school boards, or local politicians) or informal but powerful representatives (e.g., village chiefs, tribal / religious leaders).  \n\n• These representatives are perceived as legitimate spokespeople that broadly represent the interests of most stakeholders. The representative mechanism amplifies voice by fostering a high degree of community cohesion. \n\n• The relatively high social status of school administrators and teachers does not prevent representatives of the community from exercising their voice.","• While representatives of voice exist, they are perceived as representing the interests of a narrow group of stakeholders. \n\n• There may be elite capture of voice, where voice is channeled in ways that do not represent everyone's interests (and may increase or reproduce inequity between groups). There is \"voice for some\", and a low degree of community cohesion.       ","May resemble either the \"aligned for learning\" or \"aligned for selection\" criteria","• There is little or no effort to improve schools through voice. Voice has been abandoned in favor of choice (e.g., there has been mass exit to private schools, and/or reliance on \"shadow\" education services like tutoring, by both the middle class and the poor). \n\n• Elites do not exert pressure on local representatives to improve education. There has been \"elite exit\".  The representative organs of voice may exist on paper, but they do not actually meet, or have low participation, or focus on issues other than education. \n\n•The higher social status of school administration and teachers effectively silences community members from exercising their voice."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Information","Voice & Choice-Information (i)\n\nDo assessments and exams provide regular, reliable, relevant information on learning?","Guiding questions","What information do families and communities receive from assessments and exams? \nRegularity: Is information produced at many grades throughout school, and is it widely available to families?\nReliability: How trustworthy is the information?\nRelevance: Does the information convey sufficiently detailed, actionable data about the progress of children's learning?\nNote: See also Management-Information (ii) for more guiding questions related to the purpose and design of exams as related to education authorities and frontline providers."]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Standardised assessments start in primary school. Outcomes for all levels of schooling and all students are treated as important.\n\n• Norms among parents and communities uphold a low tolerance for cheating. Parents and communities trust the results of assessments and exams.\n• Exams are technically well designed and are comparable between years. \n\n• Examinations are aligned with the curriculum, and are designed to test children's conceptual and procedural mastery.\n\n• Exam results are accompanied by benchmarks that allow families and local representatives to understand if students have made appropriate progress.","• High stakes secondary school exit exam results are the most important information in the system. \n\n• Cheating may be widespread and tacitly accepted. Parents and communities may doubt the results of exams. \n•Exams need not be technically well-designed. There may be wide annual swings in scores. \n\n• Exams are designed to rank and sort students, not to measure learning. They are not necessarily aligned to the curriculum, and may emphasise memorisation.\n\n• Results are reported on a standardised scale, with little information on which skills and competencies a student has mastered, or how a school has improved.","• Information on learning may look similar to selection systems. However, in systems aligned for access there is a greater emphasis and attention paid to other types of information focused on inputs and compliance with input-related rules (e.g., enrolment, attendance, textbooks, curricular completion, and other information collected by EMIS). \n   \n","• Information on learning and information on inputs may exist. However, unlike in selection and access systems, this information has no effect on voice (i.e., it does not inform the decisions or actions of local educational representatives).\n\n• The examination body, even if nominally independent, may be politicized and tamper with results for specific groups. "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Voice & Choice-Information (ii)\n\nBeyond assessments and exams, do families get other accounts of whether their child is learning?","Guiding questions","What other forms of information are available to parents and students to monitor performance?\nWhat other forms of information are available to representatives of voice (e.g., school committees) to inform the school-related decisions and actions that they are responsible for?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Student progress is relatively visible to families throughout schooling, and focuses on learning. \n\n• There are regular school-level assessments that provide a thick \"account\" of student learning progress (e.g., report cards with qualitative comments rather than just letter grades, parent-teacher meetings).\n\n• Parents have the education to observe their child's learning progress, or there is support for parents to understand their children's progress beyond observable foundational skills.   ","• How much students are learning may be opaque to parents throughout most of schooling, except after major high-stakes exams. \n\n• School-level assessments of student progress focus on scores on tests that mimic the format high-stakes exams, or other criteria for promotion to the next level of schooling.\n\n• Many parents may lack the education to directly observe their child's own learning progress beyond observable foundational skills (i.e. reading the newspaper). ","• How much students are learning may be opaque to parents throughout most of schooling. \n\n• School-level assessments of student progress are less likely to be shared with parents. If they exist, they likely focus on inputs (e.g., attendance, behavior), and superficial measures of student progress (e.g., pass/fail).    \n\n• Many parents may lack the education to directly observe their child's own learning progress beyond observable foundational skills (i.e. reading the newspaper). "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Finance","Voice & Choice-Finance (i)\n\nPublic financing:\nTo what extent does the local level have discretion over public financing of education?\n","Guiding questions","Can (the representatives of) families and local communities (a) monitor and (b) influence school budget allocations? How extensive is their influence over various componets of the budget?\nHow transparent are school budgets? Can school budgets be flexbily reallocated to meet local needs?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Voice has some oversight (although not necessarily day-to-day decision-making power) over the school budget (usually excluding teacher salaries).\n\n• School budgets are transparent, and flexible enough to meet locally nominated needs. ",null,"• Voice has weak oversight on decisions around how public funds are spent in local schools. \n\n• The budget is not transparent, nor flexible enough to meet locally nominated needs. Voice may have oversight over parts of the education budget (i.e. capitation grant), but this may be so small as a percentage of the overall budget that is cannot cover much beyond day-to-day operational needs. \n\nAdditional indicator for patronage systems:\n• There is high mistrust of giving oversight of funds to the local level out of fear of corruption. "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Voice & Choice-Finance (ii)\n\nPrivate financing: To what extent do families and local communities make direct financial contributions to local public schools?","Guiding questions","When families spend money on education, how much of this spending goes toward local public schools versus toward private schools or private tutoring?\nDo parents feel like they have financial \"skin in the game\" in terms of the resources of local public schools?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Either private spending on public education may be substantial (formally or informally, as \"user fees\" or in-kind contributions); or (in more developed countries) levels of taxation are relatively high, and a significant portion of the tax base is used transparently to fund local schools.\n\n• Because parents have \"skin in the game\", they have a sense of ownership of the school and some leverage to exercise voice in the financial decision-making of the school.",null,"• Parents don't provide significant private financing to local public schools. The majority of private spending on education is as an individual investment (e.g., on private schools or private tutoring) rather than an investment in local public schools.\n\n• Parents have little \"skin in the game\", and this is accompanied by weak voice and detachment from the financial decision-making of the school. "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
["Motivation","Voice & Choice-Motivation (i)\n\nHow much discretion does the local level have over school staffing decisions?","Guiding questions","Do local representatives of families and communities, whether official (e.g., school management committees) or unofficial (e.g., community leaders, tribal chiefs) have any direct or indirect influence over which school leaders / teachers are hired? Or over how school leaders / teachers are compensated?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• Voice has some role in overseeing school leaders or teachers (i.e. hiring, firing, appraisal, recognition). In some contexts, voice may be directly involved in decisions surrounding teacher contracts (as in the case of contract teachers that are hired by the school). More commonly, voice has some role in school governance decisions that affect teachers (e.g., choosing school leadership, or getting regular accounts from school leadership on their management decisions surrounding teachers).",null,"• Voice has little role in overseeing school leaders or teachers.\n\nAdditional indicator for patronage systems:\n• There is particular mistrust of giving any control over teacher hiring to the local level out of fear of graft. "]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews"]
[null,"Voice & Choice-Motivation (ii)\n\nHow does community esteem and respect affect teachers'  job satisfaction?","Guiding questions","What would make the local community view a particular teacher as \"good\" or \"bad\"?\nIf a teacher were viewed as \"bad\", would the community be able to use informal social sanctions to influence their behaviour?"]
[null,null,"Illustrative indicators for each alignment","• If a teacher is viewed negatively by the local community, this is usually related to inadequate contributions to student learning (e.g., the teacher is viewed as not using their time in the classroom to adequately cultivate children's learning, or the teacher only pays attention to higher-achieving children).\n\n• Whatever their relative social status, teachers care to some degree about community members' perceptions of them.","• If a teacher is viewed negatively by the local community, this is usually related to inadequacies in exam results or credentials. If the teacher pays the most attention to the highest-achiveing children, most members of the local community would not view this as a shortcoming. \n\n• Whatever their relative social status, teachers care to some degree about community members' perceptions of them.","• If a teacher is viewed negatively by the local community, this may be related to inadequate deployment of inputs (e.g., the teacher shows up to school late or leaves early).\n\n•Teachers may be relatively insulated from the community by their social status, and not put much store in community members' perceptions of them. They are more likely to see themselves - and be seen - as government officials who were simply posted to the area.  ","• Even if a teacher is viewed negatively by the local community, families may refrain from expressing that dislike out of fear of political repercussions for themselves or in-school repercussions for their children.\n\n• Teachers may be indifferent to the respect (or lack therof) of the local community, because they prioritise the status they receive from connections to influential politicians, political parties, and/or interest groups. If a teacher is viewed as a respected member of the community, this respect may be linked to the teacher's political ties."]
[null,null,"Summary from desk review"]
[null,null,"Missing information (and whom to ask)"]
[null,null,"Summary from workshops/ interviews (interviews, workshops)"]
["Overall description of the Voice & Choice relationship\n\nPossible questions to consider: \n- Overall what is the dominant goal that the relationship is aligned with?\n- How much alignment or misalignment is there between the elements? Are the elements aligned toward the same goals or different goals? \n- Are there de jure and de facto gaps between the elements? (e.g., Delegation defines success or quality in a certain way de jure, but there is no Information collected about it de facto.) "]

{"sheet":"Tool #7 Misalignments analysis","index":7,"n_rows":5,"n_cols":12,"rows_kept":5,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[[2,0,3,0],[2,10,3,10],[2,11,3,11],[2,1,2,4],[2,5,2,9]]}
["Tool #7. Misalignments analysis"]
[]
["Misalignment between relationships or within a relationship?","Relationship(s) involved",null,null,null,"Element(s) involved",null,null,null,null,"Evidence and justification","Suggested principles for intervention "]
[null,"Politics","Compact","Manage-ment","Voice & Choice","Delegation","Finance","Information","Motivation","Support"]
["Example:\n\nWithin.",null,null,"\n\nX",null,"\n\nX",null,"\n\nX",null,"\n\nX","Example:\n\nTeachers are expected to deliver the national curriculum (see Primary School Curriculum Standards Document XYZ; delegation), but primary school leaving exam is not aligned with the curriculum (see analysis of curriculum-assessmment alignment by ABC & DEF, 2021; information). Also, teacher training only focuses on general pedagogical principles rather than on content knowledge or pedagogical content knowledge (workshops with teachers on DATE 1 and DATE 2; support).","Example:\n\nEstablish structures for coordination between the curriculum authority, the examinations authority, and pre-service teacher education providers. "]